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The Civil
Investigative Demand
By Rimmn K. DECKER*
"We recognize that the Department (of Justice) has been
handicapped and accept the Judicial Conference conclusion that
present civil investigative machinery is inadequate for effective
antitrust enforcement. The problem is, therefore, to devise a
pre-complaint civil discovery process for use where civil proceedings
are initially contemplated and voluntary cooperation by those
under investigation fails."'
With these words, the Attorney General's Committee initated
the effort to provide the Antitrust Division with a tool for use in
civil investigations. The Committee's recommendation of a "Civil
Investigative Demand" climaxed discussion within and without
the Antitrust Division as to the need for, and the means of
providing, more effective and less cumbersome investigative pro-
cedures when the Division contemplates only civil proceedings.
The proposed legislation which has resulted would put civil and
cnminal investigations on a more equal footing.
For many years, attorneys within the Division had discussed the
problem of using a grand jury in investigations resulting only in
O Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Illinois.
'Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. [hereinafter cited as Att'y Gen.
Rep.] 345 (1955). The Prettyman Report, Procedure in Anti-Trust and other
Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62, 67 (1951), observed:
It is said that vague complaints m civil antitrust cases brought by
the Government are unavoidable, because the inquisitorial power of
the Department of Justice in civil matters is inadequate and the
Department's only recourse is to file complaints containing indefinite
allegations and thereafter to utilize the processes of the court to dis-
cover the facts. It may well be that the powers of investigation of
the Department are not sufficient for these tasks and that Congress
should be asked to remedy that deficiency, or that the ample in-
vestigative powers of the Federal Trade Commission should be
utilized.
The Prettyman Report noted further that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"were not intended to make the courts an investigatory adjunct to the Depart-
ment of Justice," and that the Government or any other plaintiff "cannot pretend
to bring charges in order to discover whether actual charges should be brought."
Ibsd.
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civil proceedings. While it had long been the policy of the
Department of Justice to utilize the grand jury in investigations
only when cnminal proceedings were contemplated, the decision
to use a grand jury was not difficult to justify in view of the Sher-
man Act criminal penalties, and it was not then considered essen-
tial to decide at the outset whether only civil proceedings would
be instituted. It was easy to decide that the nature of the prosecu-
tion would depend upon the results of the investigation to be
conducted and that criminal indictment might be sought. Never-
theless, many attorneys within the Division were bothered by the
use of the grand jury in situations in which it was most likely that
the Department would not proceed by indictment. However, agree-
ment could not be reached on an alternative procedure, and it was
not until the Attorney General's Committee separated the request
for documentary material from the requirement of oral testimony
that a feasible procedure emerged.'
There is a considerable body of opinion that any investigative
procedure which does not include the requirement of oral testimony
under oath is not a significant investigative tool. The more general
view, however, is that the necessary administrative safeguards which
are concomitants to the power to require oral testimony would
radically alter the Division from its prosecuting functions and thus
impair its effechveness. 3 With this power absent the proposal of a
civil investigative demand gained many supporters.
Shortly after the Committee transmitted its report to the
2The need for such authority has been questioned and some side effects
have been suggested, not the least of which is that "some less serious offenses
which might otherwise go untouched, may be picked up mn a dragnet of civil
proceedings." BNA Antitrust Rep. No. 11, p. B-3 (1961). It has also been
suggested that the creation of such authority would encourage review of record
disposition programs to provide for disposition of all otherwise non-essentialdeuments. IlM.
3 The Attorney General's Committee said:
We reject the proposal for legislation authorizing the Department of
Justice to issue the type of admimstrative subpoena typically employed
by regulatory agencies. Unlike the Federal-Trade Comnussion, for
example, the Department of Justice is entrusted only with law enforce-
ment. The grant of subpoena powers suggests broader regulatory
powers, structural reorganization, a system of hearing officers and a
panoply of administrative procedural protections winch the Com-
mittee is not prepared to recommend. We would, m addition. dis-
approve any subpoena power that would perit prosecuting officers
in antitrust investigations to summon sworn oral testimony by placing
businessmen under oath in the absence of a hearing officer and like
safeguards. Such authority is alien to our legal traditions, readily
susceptible to grave abuse and, moreover, seems unnecessary.
Att'y Gen. Rep., op. cit. supra note 2, at 845-46.
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Attorney General on March 31, 1955, Congressman Celler intro-
duced House Bill 7309' to provide legislative authority for a civil
investigative demand. In 1956, the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association endorsed the principle of the civil in-
vestigative demand and authorized its Antitrust Section to support
legislation establishing such a procedure with appropriate safe-
guards." The Antitrust Section has consistently supported the,
principle of the civil investigative demand. It has been a strong
voice in the effort to obtain legislation which would give the Anti-
trust Division an appropriate tool but which would, at the same
time, protect the nghts of recipients of such a Demand.6
Where criminal proceedings are contemplated, adequate power
exists to compel, through the use of a grand jury subpoena, the
production of all documents and testimony necessary to determine
whether an indictment should be returned. However, the determi-
nation of whether an aiititrust violation exists often depends upon
a careful analysis of economic facts which must be developed from
the examination of voluminous documents and from consideration
of much detailed information. Grand jurors are seldom versed in
business affairs and this presents difficulties in focusing their
attention on those facts which are significant in determining the
existence or non-existence of a violation. It is not unfair or critical
of Antitrust Division attorneys to say that if the government
attorneys desire to obtain an indictment the grand jury will return
one. Consequently, and apparently through the fault of no one in
particular, the time-honored function of the grand jury as an
independent inquisitorial body is not possible in antitrust matters.
The only other alternative available to the Department of
Justice in criminal proceedings is the filing of an information. This
would have to be done without the benGfit of compulsory investiga-
tive powers and is, therefore, not a practical alternative. As a result,
4 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (referred to Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives on July 13, 1955).
G 81 A.B.A. Rep. 410-18 (1956).
6 Statements were submitted to the appropriate Congressional Committees
by the ABA Antitrust Section: In March, 1956, on 'H.R. 7309, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1955) (Congressman Celler); March, 1959, on S. 716. 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959) (Senator Kefauver), and on S. 1003, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)
Senator Wiley); June, 1961, on S. 167, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (Senator
Kefauver); and August, 1961, on H.R. 6689, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (Con-
gressman Celler). Oral testimony was presented on behal of the ABA Antitrust
Section, by William Simon m June. 1961, before the Senate Committee and mn
August, 1961, beforethe House Committee.
0
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when the Department determines cnminal action is necessary, the
grand jury will still be utilized.
When the Department of Justice has decided it will act only on
the civil side it has had to depend upon the voluntary cooperation
of those it chose to contact during its investigation. In the absence
of such voluntary cooperation, the Department either had to
abandon the investigation or determine upon the use of the grand
jury despite its preference to proceed by civil complaint.
It is probably true that in the great majority of instances, there
has been cooperation from parties from whom the Government
has sought information. In recent years, however, it is also true
that many companies have adopted a policy of something less than
full voluntary cooperation. Others have determined upon a course
of refusing any voluntary cooperation. It has grown to be a practice
among many companies to insist upon some rather detailed
specification of the information sought by the Department of
Justice before cooperation is forthcoming. This practice is premised
not only on the protection of the rights of the company being
investigated but also on the avoidance of subsequent dispute as to
whether a company has cooperated.
There would appear to be no -hardship. on the Government to
prepare a descnptive statement of the desiredinformation. Since
much of its investigatory work is done by FBI agents, something
of this kind is already being prepared. It would appear, therefore,
that the Department is not impeded in its inveshgations by an
insistence that it specify the information it is seeking. The com-
pany or its attorney can then use this statement as a guide in
having company records checked to produce information relevant
to that investigation. Actually, the procedure wh lihas been
gaining acceptance closely resembles the procedure embodied m
the proposed legislation providing for the civil investigative de-
mand.
The proponents of the civil investigative demand, however, do
not urge it as a substitute either for the grand jury or the request
for voluntary cooperation. The Attorney General's Report stated:
The Attorney General should resort to this Demand
where requests for voluntary production would probably
prove not fully effective. If, as seems likely, the Demand in
practice becomes an effective tool to compel production of
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data adequate for precomplaint investigation, its successful
use should end the necessity for utilizing the grand jury
process in civil antitrust investigations. Thus, it would
complement, not supersede, the grand jury, which retains its
proper role in criminal investigations.7
The report was speaking well before the Supreme Court decided
that it was an abuse of process to use a grand jury in an antitrust
investigation where there is no intention to bring a criminal case.8
This decision should also dispose, for the most part, of the dissents
expressed in the Attorney General's Report. There is no answer
-other than disagreement-to the argument that a civil investiga-
tive demand limited to the production of documents cannot give
the Government the information it needs to draft an intelligent
complaint or to decide whether to proceed civilly or criminally
The proposed "Antitrust Civil Process Act"' authorizes the
Department of Justice to issue a Civil Investigative Demand in
civil antitrust investigations. Such a Demand may be issued by the
Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division, whenever he has reason to believe that any
person,"0 not a natural person, may be in possession, custody or
control of any documentary material relevant to an antitrust in-
vestigation." Such a Demand must be in writing and it cannot be
issued after the institution of a civil or a criminal proceeding based
upon the same suspected violation.'" The person upon whom such
a demand is served is required to produce such documentary ma-
terial for examination, inspection and copying or reproduction's
by a custodian identified in the Demand.1
4
7 Att'y Gen. Rep., op. cit. supra note 2, at 347.8 United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
9 S. 167, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). was passed by the Senate on Septem-
ber 20, 1961. The House abandoned the compamon House bill, H.R. 6689, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), and, after certain amendments, passed S. 167 on
February 26, 1962. S. 167 was sent to a Committee on Conference to resolve the
differences in the two bills. On July 18, 1962, the House failed to accept the
Conference Committee Report. A motion to recommit the bill to the Committee
on Conference passed by a vote of 202 to 200. The Committee on Conference
was instructed to insist on certain House amendments wbich would limit the
issuance of a Demand only to those "under investigation" and would restrict use
of demanded documents to the Department of Justice. References herein are to
S. 167 as amended and agreed upon by the Conference Committee.
10 If the House view prevails, such a person must be "under investigation."
See note 7 supra.
11 Antitrust Civil Process Act [hereinafter referred to as "Act"] §3(a).1 2 Act, §3(a).
13 Act, §3 a
14 Act, §38 b(4).
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The act prescribes certain standards for and some limitations
on the Demand. The Demand shall state the nature of the conduct
constituting the alleged antitrust violation which is under investiga-
tion as well as the applicable provision of the law or laws covering
the alleged violation. 15 The Demand shall describe the class or
classes of documentary material to be produced and such descnp-
tion shall be with such definiteness and certainty as to permit
such matenal to be fairly identified. 6 The Demand shall also
prescribe a return date which will provide a reasonable period of
time within which the material so demanded may be assembled
and made available for such inspection and copying or reproduc-
tion.'7 The Demand shall not contain any requirement which
would be held to be unreasonable if contained in a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum. 8 Nor shall such a Demand require the
production of any documentary evidence which would be privileged
from disclosure if demanded by a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.
The specified materials shall be made available for inspection
and copying or reproduction at the principal place of business of
the person whose materials are sought unless otherwise agreed to in
writing with the custodian. The return date may also be vaned
by such a written agreement.20
The custodian shall take possession of the copies of the docu-
ments he has made pursuant to the inspection and thereafter he
is responsible for the use made of the documents and for the
return of them.2 While a custodian may have additional copies
made as may be required for official use he may not permit exami-
nation of the material by anyone other than a duly authorized
member or employee of the Department of justice or of the
Federal Trade Commission 22 without the consent of the person
who produced the material. 3 The Senate version of S.167 would
have used the term "any antitrust agency" instead of the Federal
Trade Commission. The Senate language would have included
15 Act, §3(b) (1).
16 Act, §8(b) (2).
17 Act, §3(b) (8.
18Act, §3(c) (1.
19Act, §3(c) (2). See Act, §5(a), which suggests that under certain circum-
stances originals of demanded documents must be relinquished.2 0 Act, §4(b).
2 1 Act, §4(b).
22 If the House prevails, the FTC will not be able to examine demanded
documents. See note 7 supra.2 3 Act, §4(c).
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any board, commission or agency of the United States charged by
law with the administration or enforcement of any antitrust law or
the adjudication of proceedings arising under any such law. 24 Un-
doubtedly this would include the Federal Trade Commission, but
in addition, with respect to the enforcement of compliance with
Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act, it would presumably
include the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Com-
munications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the
Federal Reserve Board.
25
The purpose sought to be achieved by this legislation has not
encountered any appreciable opposition dunng the seven years it
has been before Congressional Committees.26 There is, however,
much difference of opinion as to how that purpose should be
achieved. It would serve no useful function here to attempt to
review these differences in detail-even if I felt competent to do so.
Throughout the consideration of the legislation it has been
recognized that adequate investigatory processes are essential for
effective antitrust enforcement and that such enforcement should
not be left dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of those
under investigation. At the same time vesting power in the
Attorney General to issue and seek judicial enforcement of a civil
investigative demand would lodge in the Executive Department
considerable power in the nature of a subpoena. It is felt, therefore,
that the exercise of such power should be surrounded with adequate
safeguards. The recommendations of the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association have been made with these pnnciples in
mind.
The Demand is, of course, restricted in its application to
"documentary material" which is defined in very broad terms to
include "the original or any copy of any book, record, paper, com-
munication, tabulation, chart, or other document. ' 27 This defini-
tion would not appear to omit any writing found in a company's
files but the documentary material which may be demanded must
be "relevant to an antitrust investigation." 28 Much was said in the
heanngs about the use of the word "relevant" in preference to the
24 S. 167, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(b) (1961) (ongmal Senate version).
2549 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §21 (a) (1958).26 See note 2 supra; Perry and Simon, The Civil Investigative Demand: New
Fact-Finding Powers for the Antitrust Division, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 855 (1960).
27 Act, §2(h).28 Act, §3 a).
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word "pertinent" which was in earlier versions of the bill. It was
contended that relevancy is a concept which is well-known in the
law 9 and that the courts would therefore have less difficulty in
interpreting this language than if a new concept of pertinency were
to be introduced.
It is comforting to have a familiar concept nearby when one
looks at the subject matter it defines. This is especially true here
when one considers the rather startling ramifications which flow
from the definition of "antitrust investigation." The scope of a
particular investigation is controlled to some extent by the fact
that the act requires that each Demand shall "state the nature of
the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust violation which is
under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto.
30
What constitutes an "antitrust investigation" is a real question
which is illustrated by considenng the defined terms beginning
with "antitrust investigation."
An "antitrust investigation" is defined to mean "any inquiry
conducted by any antitrust investigator for the purpose of ascertain-
ing whether any person is or has been engaged in any antitrust
violation." 3' An "antitrust violation" is a defined term and means
"any act or omission in violation of any antitrust law or any anti-
trust order."32 Now "antitrust order" is a defined term,3 and means
"any final order of the Federal Trade Commission 34 or any final
order, decree, or judgment of any court of the United States, duly
entered in any case or proceeding arising under any antitrust law"
"Antitrust law" is a defined term35 and bnefly stated includes the
Sherman, Wilson Tariff, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission
acts, together with any subsequently enacted statute which pro-
hibits, or makes available to the United States any civil remedy
with respect to, any restraint upon or monopolization of interstate
29 Act. §5(e) reads: "To the extent that such rules may have application
and are not mconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure shall apply to any petition under this Act." Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, for
example, covenng motions to produce has resulted in a host of cases contributing
to a determination of the meaning of relevancy in any specific situation.
30 Act, §3(b)(1).3 1 Act, §2(d).
3
2 Act, §2(e).
3 3 Act §2(c).
34 the House version prevails the language "any finat order of the Federal
Trade Commission" will be dropped from this definition. See motion to recom-
mit, 108 Cong. Rec. 13042 (daify ed. July 18, 1962).
3 Act, §2(a). All of the definitions are subject to the prefatory language m
§2, i.e., "For the purposes of this Act."
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or foreign commerce or any unfair trade practice in or affecting
such commerce.
Taking this all together then, the civil investigative demand
may require the production for inspection and copying or reproduc-
tion of any documentary matenal relevant to any inquiry conducted
by any antitrust investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether
any person is or has been engaged in any act or omission in viola-
tion of the Sherman, Wilson Tariff, Clayton, or Federal Trade
Commission acts, or any final order of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 6 or any final order, decree, or judgment of any court of
the United States, duly entered in any case or proceeding ansing
under the Sherman, Clayton, or Federal Trade Commission acts.
Does this mean that, although the Department of justice is not
authonzed to bnng actions to enforce the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in charge of the Antitrust Division, may conduct an investiga-
tion to determine whether anyone has performed any act or omis-
sion in violation of such law 37
The Act defines "person"381 to mean any corporation, associa-
tion, partnership, or other legal entity not a natural person.
Obviously this would exclude the natural person from the category
of those who may be required to produce documentary material.
But does the definition also preclude the Department of Justice
from bringing an action against a natural person as a result of an
investigation using the Demand? The definition of "antitrust
investigation" refers to inquiries to ascertain whether any "person"
has violated the law Should "person" here be read to exclude the
natural person so as to prohibit investigations of him by use of the
Demand?
Will the Department of Justice be able to use the Demand to
ascertain whether Federal Trade Commission orders are being
violated, or whether orders by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, or the Federal Reserve Board under sections 2, 3, 7,
36 See note 82 supra.37 Congressman Celler suggests the possibility of use of the Demand by the
Department of Justice in its "enforcement functions" under the Federal Trade
Commission Act "such as, for example, 88 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45(1)
(1958), authonzing a suit to recover penalties for violations of final cease and
desist orders." 17 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 225 (May, 1962).
38 Act, §2(g).
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and 8 of the Clayton Act are being violated? If the House of
Representatives stands by the position taken on July 18, 1962, when
it approved a motion to recommit the conference report, the scope
of antitrust investigations in which the Demand can be used will
not extend to alleged violations of Federal Trade Commission
orders or orders of any antitrust agency. 9
These problems are only illustrative and with respect to some
of them, it is possible the definition of "antitrust investigator" may
provide some answers. An "antitrust investigation" is an inquiry
conducted by any "antitrust investigator." 40 The Act defines "anti-
trust investigator" as "any attorney or investigator employed by the
Department of Justice who is charged with the duty of enforcing
or carrying into effect any antitrust law."'41 Until the advent of the
proposed Antitrust Civil Process Act, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act has not been included within the generally accepted
definition of "antitrust laws." Consequently, a Department of
Justice attorney or investigator would not be charged with the duty
of enforcing that Act unless the Antitrust Civil Process Act changes
the situation.
The Act does define "antitrust law"42 to include the Federal
Trade Commission Act but with the prefatory language: "For the
purposes of this Act."43 Does this definition of "antitrust law"
have the effect of changing the duty and authority of Department
of Justice attorneys or investigators? My answer is that it does not,
but will the courts agree?
The Act requires a person served with such a Demand to
assemble such documentary material and make it available for
examination or inspection and for copying or reproduction4 4 at the
principal place of business of such person or at such other place
as the Custodian and such person may agree in writing.4 - Earlier
bills would have required the production and surrender of onginal
documents. In all likelihood, these documents would have been
removed to Washington or to one of the regional offices of the
Antitrust Division for examination and analysis. Lack of avail-
39 108 Cong. Rec. 13042 (daily ed. July 18, 1962).4o Act, §2gd.
41 Act, §2(f).
4 2 Act, §2(a).4
3 ACt, §2.
44 Act, §§a), 3(b)(4).45 Act, §4(b).
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ability of these records might have senously inconvenienced the
company and it was ultimately concluded that a procedure similar
to the post-complaint discovery procedure,46 and similar also to
the access to records provision incorporated in antitrust decrees for
enforcement purposes, would serve the purposes of the Antitrust
Division without working a hardship on the investigation. More-
ever, such a procedure of production for inspection and copying
has the additional beneficial effect of encouraging antitrust in-
vestigators to take a selective, rather than a wholesale approach in
drafting the Demand.
A great deal depends upon the way the Antitrust Division
decides to utilize the Demand. For example, the standards pre-
scribed for the content of a Demand are subject to different inter-
pretations. The Act requires that the Demand "shall state the
nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation which is
under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto."47
This is pretty general language. I would expect to learn more from
the Demand if the Act required that each Demand "shall state the
subject-matter of the investigation, including the particular offense
which the Attorney General has reason to believe may have been
committed, and the statute and section or sections thereof alleged
violation of which is under investigation." Now, maybe this says
the same thing. If so, fine. If it doesn't, I think it would be no
more restnctive on the Division to be more specific.
It is important that the Demand give specific information at
this point, because this is one of the standards by which a court
must measure the scope of the Demand. It is also one of the
standards by which a company served with a Demand must
determine the return it should make. The company must make
some selection of the records it will make available for inspection
and copying by the Antitrust Division and it is not possible to do
this intelligently unless the Demand discloses the nature of the
antitrust violation being investigated. A court would need this
same information to know whether the Demand contained any
"unreasonable" or improper requirements, 4 or whether it en-
croached upon any recognized privilege.4
9
46 Fed. B. Civ. P. 34.47Act, §3(b) (1).4 8 Act, §8(c) (1).
49 Act, §3(c) (2).
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A similar problem exists with respect to the requircment that
the Demand "shall describe the class or classes of documentary
material to be produced thereunder with such dcfinitcncss and
certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified.""0 It
would have been preferable, in my opinion to have omitted the
words "class or classes," and thereby direct that the definiteness
and certainty of the description be of the documents themselves
rather than of the type of documents. No one expects a description
of specific letters or memoranda by date, author, and addressee.
The Demand wouldn't be needed if the Division had that much
information. On the other hand, one cannot make an intelligent
selection of relevant documents if the Demand calls for "all sales
correspondence" or "all marketing memoranda." It might be
agreed that these are "classes of documents" but it takes more
information than that to determine relevance to a particular in-
vestigation.
In the event a person upon whom such a Demand is served
fails to comply with it, a petition may be filed in the district court
for the district in which such person resides, is found, or transacts
business for an order of enforcement. If such a person transacts
business in more than one such district, the petition shall be filed
in the district in which that person maintains his pnncipal place of
business-or in such other district as may be agreed upon by the
parties.51 Prior to the return date specified in the Demand, or
within twenty days, whichever is shorter, a person upon whom
such a Demand is served, many petition the district court in the
district within which such person resides, is found, or transacts
business for an order modifying or setting aside the Demand.
Filing such a petition tolls the running of the time allowed for
compliance.52 This procedure is comparable to that applicable to
antitrust grand jury subpoenas and, while not perfect, it has been
found to be workable.
53
When there is failure to comply with the Demand, the Anti-
5oAct, §3(b) (2).
51 Act, §5(a).
-Act §5(b).
53 Questions of reasonableness, pnvilege and the like may be litigated whether
the petition is filed by the company prior to return date or by the Department
seeking to enforce compliance. See Letter from Congressman Celler to Milton
Handler, March 8, 1962, reproduced m 17 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 225 (May,
1962).
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trust Division can get a court order enforcing the Demand which,
if disobeyed, may be punished under contempt procedures. This
coupled with existing statutory provisions 54 for punishment or con-
cealment of material facts or for obstruction of justice, which have
been adequate to deal with situations encountered in the past
would seem to be sufficient enforcement authority 55 However, for
no reason apparent from the hearings,56 the Act provides for
additional criminal sanctions.57 It is to be hoped that the intent
requirement of the penal provision will be some protection to
persons served with a Demand, but the possibility it creates of
criminal prosecution for perhaps wrongly appraising a document
as privileged or non-responsive, or for carrying out established
procedures for the destruction of old records, is an unfair burden
upon businessmen and their counsel.
The Act provides for the creation of an office to be known as
Antitrust Document Custodian.5 8 This Custodian must be identi-
fied in the Demand and he shall be responsible for the use of the
documents and for their return. 59 We have already noted that the
Custodian has authority to make copies of the material with limita-
tions as to whom he may make the material available for examina-
tion."0 The Act permits him to deliver such documentary material
to any attorney who has been designated to appear on behalf of the
United States before any court, grand jury, or the Federal Trade
Commission0' in any case or proceeding involving any alleged anti-
trust violation. Upon the conclusion of any such case or proceed-
ing, such attorney shall return to the Custodian any documentary
material which has not passed into the control of the court, grand
jury, or the Federal Trade Commission 62 through the introduction
54 18 U.S.C. §1001 (1958).
55The Attorney General's Committee saw no need for further penal
sanctions.5 6 Other than a plea therefor by the Assistant Attorney General mn charge of
the Antitrust Division.
5 7 Act, §6 a5 8 Act, §4(a
59 Act, §4(c).
6
0 Act, §4(c). Despite such limitations these documents should not be
immune from production through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure once a
civil action has been instituted.
01 The House motion to recommit the conference report instructed its Com-
mittee on Conference to insist the "antitrust agency"' and the FTC be precluded
from access to demanded documents. 108 Cong. Rec. 18042 (daily ed. July 18,
1962).
62 Ibid,
1963]
KENmciC LAW JOURNAL
of such documentary material into the record of such case or
proceeding.
63
Upon the completion of the antitrust investigation for which
the matenal was produced or upon the completion of any case or
proceeding arising from the investigation, the Custodian shall
return all the documentary material produced which has not been
introduced in some case or proceeding, other than copies the
Custodian has made which were required for official use under
regulations which are to be promulgated by the Attorney General.
64
As a result, in many instances, there will be returned to the person
producing the documents something less than all the copies of
such documents which may be in the government's possession.
This procedure will not only encourage but will require the
accumulation of a library of copies of documents, lending natural
impetus to the commencement of cases based on ancient history
Retention of these copies would be contrary to the holding of the
Supreme Court in United States v Wallace and Tiernan Co."
Moreover, coincident with the completion of any case or proceed-
ing growing out of the investigation is the termination of the
Antitrust Division's right to the documentary material. The Anti-
trust Division's interest in such documentary material and its power
to require production is premised on the antitrust investigation
specified in the Demand which is authorized by the Act. When
the reason for requiring production of the documents no longer
exists the right to retain the documents terminates. In comparison
with a grand jury, it might be noted that when the term of a grand
jury expires, the government's right to documents produced in
response to a grand jury subpoena ends and further retention of
the documents is dependent upon issuance by the court of an
impounding order.66
Within a reasonable time after completion of the examination
and analysis of all evidence assembled ii the course of an investiga-
tion, a person upon whom such a Demand has been served, may
demand return of all the documentary material he has produced,
6 3 Act, §4(d).64 Act, §4(e).
63836 U.S. 793, 801 (1949). See also United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1958).6 6 See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., supra note 65; Traub v. United
States, 226 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Application of Bendix Aviation Corp., 58
F Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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other than the copies just referred to.67 There is nothing said in
the Act which would enable one to determine when such a
reasonable time has expired and no individual company can know
the extent of an investigation so as to be able to compute this
"reasonable time." A simple expedient which would have elimi-
nated this problem without any hardsh p on the Antitrust Division
would have been to provide for an autfmatic expiration date for a
Demand after which the documents would have to be returned
unless the parties agreed to an extension or unless the Division,
upon showing good cause, obtained an extension from a court.
Because of the comparability to a grapd jury subpoena the period
during which a Demand could be in orce might have been set at
eighteen months.68  ,
The whole concept of the office of "custodian" is really unneces-
sary under a procedure of inspection and copying documents. This
procedure is well known under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure with relation to discovery69 and as the materials are being
sought by the Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Antitrust Division, that office becomes responsible
for the documents as is the case today in government civil antitrust
cases.
The Act provides for replacement of a Custodian in the event
of his death, disability or separation from service ° but this is likely
to be a situation which will create administrative headaches. Not
only must the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division "promptly" designate another antitrust investigator to
serve as Custodian, but he shall also "promptly" transmit notice in
writing to the person who produced such matenal of the identity
and address of the successor so designated.7 1 It can readily be seen
that after a penod of time there will be any number of Custodians
designated to act and there may be literally hundreds of companies
who will be recipients of such Demands to whom notices must go
every time a Custodian leaves the Government or otherwise ceases
to serve. It would seem to be a very awkward and possibly a com-
pletely unmanageable situation.
67Act. §4(f).6 8 Fed. R. Cnm. P. 6, provides that no grand jury may serve more than
eighteen months.69 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
70 Act, §4(g).
71 Act, §4(g).
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The Act also includes a saving provision which would permit
the Department of justice to institute a grand jury with respect to
any alleged antitrust violation even though the civil investigative
demand procedure had been utilized with respect to a violation
which might later be presented to the grand jury 72 This would
seem to be a necessary safeguard to protect the Department against
committing itself to proceed only civilly in those circumstances
where further investigaton-which is, after all, the purpose of the
Demand-indicates the necessity, as a matter of Department policy,
to bring criminal action. Such a provision is not an encouragement
to the Department to utilize the Demand as a stepping stone to
grand jury proceedings, but without it the Department might be
reluctant to use the Demand except in those situations where it
was beyond doubt that criminal proceedings would not be desirable,
irrespective of the facts which might be developed dunng the
investigation.
The philosophy behind the Antitrust Civil Process Act is that
the Demand would supplement and not be a substitute for the
grand jury process.13 There is no reason to believe that the Demand
would not be judiciously used, but the Demand would not elimi-
nate the need for or the use of a grand jury in appropriate circum-
stances. It is expected that the Department would continue to
use the voluntary cooperation route. While there is no obligation
on the Department to seek voluntary cooperation prior to issuance
of a Demand, it may well be that under some circumstances, this
seriatem procedure would be followed. It could be that the mere
existence of the Demand authority would increase the incidence of
voluntary cooperation.
The creation of the Demand may, in some respects, be a further
step toward what might be termed mail-order investigation. In
view of the recent effective utilization of the section 6 question-
naires by the Federal Trade Commission there is no doubt that the
Commission intends to use these to an even greater extent.74 In St.
Louis before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section,
Chairman Paul Rand Dixon said:
72 Act, §7.
73 Att'y Gen. Rep., op. cit. supra note 2, at 347.
74 See remarks of Chairman Paul Rand Dixon on January 26, 1962, before the
Section of Antitrust Law, N. Y. State Bar Ass n. BNA Antitrust Rep. No. 29,
p. A-3 (1962).
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We expect to save a good deal of professional manpower,
money, and time by using the United States mails to help
us get the facts. We are going to continue, for example, to
require the filing of special reports under the authority
granted to us by section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. This method of investigation is not only efficient and
inexpensive, but it is also, in certain circumstances, the only
practicable way to bnng about such fairness as may come
from relatively simultaneous industry-wide enforcement.75
While the Demand procedure would not lend itself as readily
as the section 6 questionnaire to mass mailings, it nevertheless is
quite possible that the Demand would be served by mail with an
investigator showing up only at the time specified for production.
In the less complicated type of situation it is not unlikely that the
company might quite willingly reproduce the documents at the
expense of the Government and send them in, without the
investigator ever visiting the company's premises. It is only in
those instances where the documents demanded are voluminous,
that the investigator would be under some compunction to make
an examination on the spot in Qrder to avoid an expensive job of
reproduction. If the documents are relatively few, it might be even
less costly for the Government to arrange to have all the documents
reproduced and sent in rather than for the- investigator to make
trips to places of business which might be some distance from his
assigned office.
In summary, I think that the Civil Investigative Demand would
bea useful tool in civil antitrust investigations and that it would be
a step forward in achieving fair and effective antitrust enforcement.
As I have indicated, I think the legislation could be improved upon
but frequently things look much worse in anticipation than they
turn out to be in realization. I hope that this is true as to the
Antitrust Civil Process Act if it passes in its present form. I feel
confident that Antitrust Division attorneys want a workable tool
and that they would interpret the Act in a constructive way
5 19 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 254 (1961).
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